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Capabilitarian Sufficiency: Capabilities and Social Justice 
Abstract      This paper suggests an account of sufficientarianism—i.e. that justice is fulfilled 
when everyone has enough—laid out within a general framework of the capability approach. In 
doing so, it seeks to show that sufficiency is especially plausible as an ideal of social justice 
when constructed around key capabilitarian insights such as freedom, pluralism, and attention to 
empirical interconnections between central capabilities. Correspondingly, we elaborate on how a 
framework for evaluating social justice would look when constructed in this way and give 
reasons for why capabilitarians should embrace sufficientarianism. We do this by elaborating on 
how capabilitarian values underpin sufficiency. On this basis, we identify three categories of 
central capabilities; those related to biological and physical needs, those to fundamental interests 
of a human agent, and those to fundamental interests of a social being. In each category, we 
argue, achieving sufficiency requires different distributional patterns depending on how the 
capabilities themselves work and interrelate. This argument adds a new dimension to the way 
capabilitarians think about social justice and changes how we should target instances of social 
justice from social-political viewpoint.       
 
Keywords: The Capability Approach; Sufficiency; Social Justice; Martha Nussbaum; Pluralism; 
Positional Goods. 
               
Introduction 
The capability approach, in most instantiations, is not a theory of social justice setting out an 
ideal societal distribution of benefits and burdens toward which we should strive. Rather, it is a 
broad normative space for the evaluation of people’s well-being and freedom with many possible 
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applications (Sen 1993; 2005; Robeyns 2005). And while this ecumenical foundation and the 
cross-cultural applicability by which it is accompanied is one of the main strengths of the 
approach, it leaves open many important questions as well. Not least, it does not tell us much 
about which capabilities we should seek to enhance, how much we should do so, and why this is 
important. On the other hand, while theories of social justice often provide relatively convincing 
and well-developed answers to these questions, they are often developed in a philosophical space 
somewhat isolated from actual processes of human development. This, many would argue, limits 
their potential for guiding concrete agents acting in the context of such processes. In this article, 
we attempt to bridge the gap between these two perspectives by proposing an ideal of social 
justice informed by the capability approach, which we shall term capabilitarian sufficiency. In a 
previous article, we have suggested that a sufficientarian ideal of social justice could be a good 
companion for the capability approach (Axelsen & Nielsen 2015), but here we wish to specify 
and elaborate on how and why this is the case. Where our previous article suggested the potential 
for approximation between the two conceptual cores, this one actively pursues a fusion. 
To clarify, accounts of sufficiency entail both a positive thesis; that bringing people 
above some threshold is especially important, and a negative thesis; that above this threshold, 
inequalities are irrelevant or alternatively, a shift thesis; that inequalities above the threshold are 
significantly less important (see Casal 2007 and Shields 2012, respectively). The positive thesis 
is fairly uncontentious – both within theories of social justice and in different forms of the 
capability approach. The negative thesis, on the other hand, would be rejected by many who find 
inequalities above the threshold very relevant to justice. The acceptance of the negative thesis 
and the involved potential inequalities at higher levels is, thus, distinctively sufficientarian. 
However, accepting the negative thesis is also, we shall claim, especially well-tuned to the 
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insights of the capability approach – especially, if, as is the case here, the sufficiency threshold is 
built on a foundation of capabilitarian insights. 
Some sufficientarian theorists such as Harry Frankfurt (1987) and Robert Huseby (2010) 
define the threshold of sufficiency level in terms of contentment (or reasonable contentment), 
thus suggesting a relatively high and subjective threshold. But although contentment gives us a 
plausible explanation to why we should accept the negative thesis—that is, being content seems 
in a relevant way to weaken ones claim for additional resources—it is less successful as a reason 
for accepting the positive thesis. In other words, it seems fair to challenge the claim that it is 
critically important from a justice point of view that no one must be discontent. As Paula Casal 
(2007) points out, this is a general issue when employing a high threshold, since this very often 
means compromising universal allegiance to the reasons underlying the positive thesis. 
Capabilitarians have long been sceptical of relying on purely subjective evaluations when 
determining people’s wellbeing and relying on capabilitarian reasoning can help sufficientarians 
escape this danger. 
Other sufficientarians suggest a fairly low threshold—e.g. basic needs or basic rights 
(Miller 2007; Shue 1996)—but while these accounts do well in justifying what is so critically 
important about reaching the threshold, they face problems with explaining why inequalities 
above the threshold are unimportant to justice. Thus, as Casal (2007) notes their answer to the 
negative thesis is less plausible, as, for example, not being concerned by inequality between the 
super-rich and people who have barely enough seems problematic. Although, capability theorists 
are less explicit about inequalities at this level, we will argue that the pluralist view about what is 
valuable in a human life can help ground the negative thesis – and do so in a way that makes 
both sufficientarianism and capability theory stronger. 
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Elsewhere, we have suggested and defended a sufficientarian ideal of social justice via 
the concept of freedom from duress, by which we mean “the freedom from significant pressure 
against succeeding in central areas of life” (Axelsen & Nielsen 2015). At the heart of this 
account is the three-step argument that: (a) justice is concerned only with people’s opportunities 
in central, as opposed to non-central, areas of life; (b) that a critical threshold of sufficiency 
exists in each particular central area; and (c) that what effectively determines sufficiency in a 
specific area depends on the distributional logic of the capabilities within that area. Thus, we 
conclude, sufficiency as freedom from duress implies, “that justice is limited in scope, pluralist 
in nature, and variable in pattern” (2015). This account, we claim, does a better job than 
alternative sufficiency views in terms of justification of both the positive and the negative 
thesis.     
The account of sufficiency as freedom from duress is loosely informed by general 
insights from the capability approach, but importantly, it is not committed to it. In fact, our 
account is compatible with a wide range of measures that adopt an objective view of value. In 
this paper, we unfold a pluralist sufficientarian account of social justice explicitly within the 
capability approach. We do this by elaborating upon the capabilitarian notions of universally 
important aspects of human life and the pluralism of the human good, and their implications for 
sufficiency. We, then, identify three broad categories of central human capabilities that seem to 
be common to capability theorists: 1) capabilities related to biological and physical human 
needs; 2) capabilities related to fundamental interests of a human agent; and 3) capabilities 
related to fundamental interests of a social being, and show how these relate to sufficiency. What 
sufficiency means with respect to these three categories differs greatly, as they are governed by 
different distributional logics. These logics are understood by unpacking the dynamics in play 
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within the respective categories and how different holdings affect one’s overall level of 
capabilities. Elaborating on ideas which are already present in capability theory and bolstering 
this by way of empirical insights and the concept of positional goods, we show why inequalities 
above the threshold can and should matter to capability theorists and sufficientarians alike - but 
because these create insufficiencies. First, however, we will outline the contours of sufficiency 
within the normative framework of the capability approach. 
 
Sufficiency and capabilities 
According to capabilitarians, other theories of justice tend to overlook important aspects of 
human existence and differences between human lives. For example, the utilitarian focus on 
maximizing utility is thought to be insufficiently sensible to the societal distribution and the 
separateness of the individuals whose lives are at stake (Nussbaum 2006, 71-72). This point is, of 
course, not particular to capabilitarians, but is also held by many liberals. At the same time, 
theories that focus solely on the amount of resources available to a person are believed to 
overlook the important differences in people’s abilities to convert resources into functionings 
(Sen 1992), while theories focusing on welfare overestimate the reliability of subjective 
preferences (Nussbaum 2000, 122-142). These latter points of criticism have mainly been 
directed against egalitarians, but of course they apply to resource or welfare sufficientarians, like 
the ones mentioned above, as well. These points of criticism spell out both how capability theory 
lends itself best to non-welfarist accounts of social justice and the problems we avoid by 
formulating sufficiency in capabilitarian terms. 
The tenet of the capability approach is that we should be concerned with securing 
individual people’s capabilities—opportunity to achieve valuable combinations of functionings, 
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or, in other words, what people are actually able to do and to be (Sen 2005; Nussbaum 2006, 
70)—as opposed to, say, maximizing or equalizing preference satisfaction, welfare, or wealth. 
Capabilitarians hold that these latter approaches simplify what is important in a human life, and 
that a theory of justice must necessarily be concerned with several aspects of the human reality 
that cannot be collapsed into one dimension without losing vital information. In Martha 
Nussbaum’s work, for example, the basis for this criticism lies in the notion that there is some 
central core to human life or, one might say, a shared base for humanity defined by central 
human capabilities. These different capabilities are implicitly believed to entail a threshold 
below which truly human functioning is not available. Getting people above this point is 
therefore of special importance (Nussbaum 2006, 293). In a similar vein, Amartya Sen (1999, 
87) has pointed to some basic capabilities for which it is crucially important to secure 
functionings above a certain level. Thus, capabilitarians, at least implicitly, subscribe to an 
unelaborated form of the positive thesis. That is, although they are unclear about its nature and 
content, they agree that some level of capabilities exists, below which no one should find 
themselves. We will try to broaden and clarify a capabilitarian basis for accepting this claim. 
As mentioned, the capability approach does not usually involve taking a clear stand on 
social justice. This is most plainly the case with respect to the negative thesis – that is, what 
justice requires above the threshold. One reason for not tackling this question explicitly seems to 
be that their main interest lies within the current world distribution, in which far too many have 
far too little with regards to their central capabilities (Sen and Nussbaum, especially, are mainly 
concerned with the world’s developing countries). Another is that it is simply no easy task to 
come with a well-reflected answer. As Nussbaum points out, “it is a difficult question how far 
adequacy of capability requires equality of capability. Such a question can be answered only by 
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detailed thought about each capability, by asking what respect for equal human dignity requires” 
(Nussbaum 2011, 40-41). We will pursue a more informed basis for answering this question by 
elaborating on reasons for why capabilitarians should accept the negative thesis explicitly, and 
why they can do so without giving up their special attention to injustices in the actual world. Our 
account will take its point of departure in the idea that different types of capabilities are governed 
by different distributional logics, and thus, that what it means to have enough varies accordingly. 
In doing so, we will show how embracing a pluralist sufficientarian ideal of social justice can 
help overcome some of the shortcomings identified in the capability approach. 
         
Central capability categories 
As mentioned, capability theorists hold that other theories of distributive justice are not 
sufficiently sensitive towards important differences between human lives (i.e. their ability to 
convert resources into functionings), and further, that they do not distinguish adequately between 
different aspects of human life. This is significant, according to capabilitarians, since the most 
important aspects of a human life are “not commensurable in terms of any single quantative 
standard” (Nussbaum 2006, 166) and because some capabilities and the functionings they enable 
are more important than others, and should, thus, receive special attention. Capability theorists 
differ on, which exact capabilities are the important ones, and on how a list of such might be 
made. Nussbaum, most notably, has proposed an index of central human capabilities, which she 
claims are common to all human beings across cultures. The overall idea of Nussbaum’s work is 
that there is some central core to the human life defined by central human capabilities. Her list 
includes life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; 
practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control over one’s environment (2000, 78-
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80; 2006, 6-78; 2011, 33-34). Sen, on the other hand, maintains that the capability approach 
ought not commit to one singular theoretical list but should be deliberately underspecified so as 
to ensure people’s agency, not only in regards to their effective access to the relevant 
functionings, but also in terms of having democratic influence on the process of deciding which 
capabilities are relevant. In other words, influence through choice over the process of listing 
relevant capabilities is in itself a freedom that should be reflected in the capabilities that people 
ought to have (Sen 1993; 1997; 2005; 2009, 242). Consequently, as Sen forcefully stresses, “To 
insist on a ‘fixed forever’ list of capabilities would deny the possibility of progress in social 
understanding, and also go against the productive role of public discussion, social agitation, and 
open debates” (Sen 2005, 160). 
        Several other theorists have positioned themselves in relation to this distinction. In order 
to maintain the political impact and applicability stemming from formulations of objective lists, 
while at the same time safeguarding the individual agency-element that is so fundamental to the 
capability approach in Sen’s original form, Ingrid Robeyns has suggested to move beyond a 
single universal list of capabilities, and focus on coming up with relevant criteria for creating 
lists of capabilities for each particular use of the capability approach to a specific field (Robeyns 
2011). In a similar vein, Sabina Alkire argues against Nussbaum’s account, that there can be no 
singular list that applies for all purposes and, thus, the selection of relevant capabilities must be 
done repeatedly and be sensitive to its particular use in a specific field and place (Alkire 2005; 
Alkire 2002, 51-53).  
        We attempt to strike a balance between the two by not committing to a specific list of 
central capabilities, but instead delineating three broad categories which are distinguished not by 
their particular content but by their distributional logics. In other words, what sets the categories 
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apart is what it takes to achieve sufficiency with respect to this type of capability. In doing so, we 
seek to avoid one line of criticism made against some capability accounts suggesting that they 
arbitrarily exclude certain valuable capabilities (Vallentyne 2005, 361-363) without succumbing 
to subjective welfarism. The categories are not fixed sets or bundles of capabilities, but should be 
understood as a typology of capabilities with the central purpose of classifying justice-relevant 
capabilities in terms of how they should be distributed. Thus, the central claim here is that if we 
believe that there is a range of capabilities, which are all important in their own right, and that 
these are not commensurable, then the governing distributive principles should be informed by 
the particular distributional logics of the different types of capabilities. This is necessary to 
properly understand which level of the specific capability is required by justice – which level is 
sufficient. We shall proceed with the following typological categories of capabilities, which we 
believe any objective definition of social justice must include: 
1. Capabilities related to biological and physical human needs. These are the 
capabilities of enjoying commodities that every human being needs in order to ensure 
biological and physical wellbeing. Obvious examples include the capabilities for 
nourishment, water, health, clean air, shelter, reproduction, sexual fulfilment, and 
physical security. These capabilities ensure the survival and bodily needs of members of 
the human species. 
2. Capabilities related to fundamental interests of a human agent. These are capabilities 
related to individual autonomy. In other words, they are those that are needed to form 
and reform valuable ends. They include the capabilities of rational reflection, 
imagination, critical thinking, normative evaluation, functional and technical skills, 
understanding the implications of choices and actions for one’s life, working, having the 
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emotional capacities to feel an appropriate range of human emotions, and feeling 
emotional attachment with other human beings. 
3. Capabilities related to fundamental interests of a social being. These are capabilities 
needed for pursuing one’s valuable ends within a community and, more generally, for 
relating to fellow human beings in the appropriate way. These include the capabilities 
for political freedoms such as the freedom to vote, the freedom of assembly and 
association, and the freedom from discrimination and oppression, but also access to 
some form of market in which one can trade on fair terms with others, the capability of 
enjoying a sufficiently high societal status, not to be dominated by others, etc. 
The characterization given here is not to be interpreted as the final end goal of any human life. 
Rather, they are three categories of capabilities that any human life must contain and thus that 
any plausible account of social justice needs to incorporate in a way that is sensible to the belief 
that the central capabilities are theoretically incommensurable — although very often in practice 
intertwined. This means that one cannot make simple trade-offs, and make up for a lack in one 
central capability by giving someone a larger amount of another (Nussbaum 2006, 167). Giving 
someone better capabilities for health and nourishment, for example, cannot justify curtailing 
their political rights, discriminating against them, or stunting their rational development. Thus, 
the conclusion proceeds, if justice is concerned with capabilities, it must be concerned with 
sufficiency in the sense of pursuing adequacy of capability; and if concerned with sufficiency in 
this sense, we need to understand what it takes to reach an adequate level of capability in each 
central area of human life. Thus, it follows that any theory, social assessment or political 
arrangement that adhere to justice would involve a suitable index of capabilities that revolves 
around a sufficiency threshold that is pluralist in nature and that this indexing procedure must 
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take into account the distributional logics of the different types of central capabilities. In order to 
reach a more comprehensive understanding of the content of the kind of threshold by which 
capabilitarians are motivated, the following sections will unfold and defend the pluralist nature 
of the threshold and elaborate on distributional logics of the different types of capabilities. 
 
Thresholds in plural 
As mentioned above, any sufficientarian theory of distributive justice must accept, and justify 
why we should accept, that bringing people above some critical threshold is especially important 
(the positive thesis). We are yet to establish, however, what is special about this threshold or, you 
might say, why the threshold should be given special importance. As reflected in the 
disagreement on which exact capabilities are most important, capabilitarians also describe the 
value that one obtains when getting above the threshold differently. Nussbaum has given the 
most explicit account of what is at stake. Leaning on Aristotle’s theory of the human good, she 
describes her list of central human capabilities as enabling people to live a life in human dignity 
(Nussbaum 2000, 70-77; 2006, 160-162; 2011, 40-41). This entails being able to function in a 
truly human way, as opposed to, say, an animal way. Thus, mere survival or the fulfillment of 
basic needs is not enough. For example, while eating just to survive might suffice for an animal, 
this is not enjoying food in a human way, nor, more clearly, is it a way to eat that is compatible 
with a life in human dignity.
i
 For Nussbaum, then, making people sufficiently well-off means 
giving them adequate capabilities for a life in human dignity. Inversely, not having enough 
means not having these dignity-facilitating capabilities. 
Regardless of specific variations in foci within the capabilitarian framework, any 
capability-based sufficiency account implies that whether or not one is sufficiently well-off 
cannot be determined solely by reference to one’s own preferences or level of resources; and that 
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being sufficiently well-off does not necessarily mean being as well-off as everyone else in these 
areas. Taken together, we claim, these insights and intuitions stemming from within the broad 
framework of the capabilities approach offer a plausible foundation on which to conceptualize 
the content of the positive thesis. This entails bringing people above a certain capability 
threshold. But, whereas sufficientarians usually hold that it is especially important to bring 
people above a certain threshold from the point of view of justice, we claim that several such 
thresholds exist. Traditionally, sufficientarianism has been unfolded within the discourse of telic 
distributive theory and, thus, defined in relation to views of philosophers such as Larry Temkin 
(2003) and Derek Parfit (1997). But whereas these views all hold a one-dimensional monist view 
of value (such as welfarism), and, consequently, so does the sufficientarianism that defines itself 
in contrast with these views (such as Frankfurt 1987, Crisp 2003, and Huseby 2010), the 
capability approach is fundamentally pluralist. It implies that the value of the human life is 
inevitably multidimensional—that is, it is concerned with various types of valuable functionings 
and capabilities (Sen 1992, 49; Nussbaum 2000, 81) and, moreover, it acknowledges that what 
social justice is, in general, concerned with is, “our ability to achieve various combinations of 
functionings that we can compare and judge against each other in terms of what we have reasons 
to value” (Sen 2009, 233). Moreover, because of the capabilitarian belief in incommensurability 
of the central capabilities, neither will it suffice to focus on some aggregate measure of 
capability. Instead, we must ensure that she has an adequate level of capabilities in all the 
relevant spheres. While the positive thesis in Casal’s original version entails that bringing people 
above some critical threshold (of well-being) is especially important from the point of view of 
justice, we argue, that such a critical threshold exists for all central capabilities. This does not 
require that any account of justice must, by itself, be able to identify which specific capabilities 
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are relevant (as discussed above), but merely that, whatever these might be, the relevant 
threshold must be identified for every  relevant capability. 
Taken together, we claim that the universal concern of justice in an abstract sense is to 
ensure that everyone has sufficient capabilities in each relevant area of human life, and that 
differences between those that have achieved this are irrelevant (from the point of view of 
justice). Again, however, it is important to note that what is required to reach the threshold and, 
thus, to have sufficient capabilities—that is to say, where the threshold lies—may differ among 
the varying capability categories. Below, we will elaborate on this difference by linking 
capabilitarian sufficiency with empirical insights about inequality and with the notion of 
positional goods in order to illuminate and outline the distributional logics of the different 
categories of capabilities, and make it clearer why justice should not be concerned with 
inequalities above the threshold—that is, why we should accept the negative thesis.  
 
Pluralism and positional goods  
As noted, the central capabilities must be taken as situated within distinct distributional 
categories, critically important in their own right, and hence a distributive scheme informed by 
capabilitarian sufficiency must incorporate pluralism as a fundamental component of distributive 
justice. This pluralism entails that the different capabilities cannot be measured on a single 
dimension and are also incommensurable. This may, at first glance, seem like a weakness since 
policy makers might be unsure about how to prioritize when unable to compare the different 
capabilities on a single dimension. Capability theorists, however, emphasize how this more 
honestly than monist theories captures the complexity of human life, and that forcing 
fundamentally distinct capabilities unto a single dimension often simplifies, and thereby 
obscures, what is actually not simple. Moreover, the entailed pluralism implies that each 
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capability should be understood appropriately based on its distributional logic. In other words, 
the different central capabilities constitute fundamentally different dimensions of the human 
good, and this distinctness is reflected in how they should be distributed. Although, this point has 
not been adequately elaborated within capability theory, the argumentative core is recognized 
within the framework. Nussbaum, for example, states that: “It appears that all the political, 
religious, and civil liberties can be adequately secured only if they are equally secured. To give 
some groups of people unequal voting rights, or unequal religious liberty, is to set them up in a 
position of subordination and indignity vis-à-vis others. It is to fail to recognize their equal 
human dignity. On the other side, there are other capabilities, closely connected with the idea of 
property or instrumental goods, where what seems appropriate is enough” (2006, 292-293). So, 
as Nussbaum indicates, sufficiency or having enough entails different distributions for different 
goods or capabilities. Thus, having an adequate amount of a certain capability sometimes means 
being above an absolute threshold that has no or little relation to what other people have, while it 
means having as much as or almost as much as others regarding the distribution of other 
capabilities. Anderson affirms the same thought; “For some functionings, equal citizenship 
requires equal levels. […] But for other functionings, standing as an equal does not require equal 
levels of functioning” (1999, 318-319).ii In other words, properly understanding the individual 
capabilities and how they empirically operate allows us to see how inequalities, when 
problematic, are actually best understood as insufficiencies. 
Thus, the importance of being sensitive to the particular type of capability and its 
distributive logic is already inherent in capability-based theories of social justice. But it is yet to 
be more systematically addressed and discussed how this general insight affects capabilitarian 
principles of social justice. In this section, we will elaborate on this idea by coupling it with the 
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notion of positional goods and empirical literature on inequality. We think that this pairing can 
help explain the reasoning behind Nussbaum’s and Anderson’s intuitions—and clarify our 
reasons for accepting the negative thesis, by showing why inequalities are sometimes important, 
since they can push people below the absolute threshold of sufficiency, and when this is (and is 
not) the case. 
Importantly, using the capability framework to clarify this connection comes with a set 
of built-in advantages. Thus, in a crucial way, constructing an account of sufficiency from within 
the framework of the capability approach means that one has already engaged with significant 
empirical insights on how different obstacles that people face may affect their opportunities to 
function in central areas of human life. This is because the capability approach, unlike other, less 
interdisciplinary frameworks for evaluating social justice, is to a large extent developed in 
connection with and evolves in constant interaction with empirical observations and 
measurements of the way in which capabilities interrelate and people’s opportunities are shaped. 
Which specific empirical data are necessary for a capabilitarian evaluation are, as mentioned, 
dependent on the nature of the task at hand. When using the framework for development studies, 
for example, knowledge about how capabilities are shaped and affected by cultural norms, 
climate, political circumstances, and geography will be important. When using the framework 
for evaluating social justice, on the other hand, it will be especially important to know how the 
levels of central capabilities – those that are important from a justice point-of-view – are 
determined. Especially, it will be important to know how the categories interrelate. And doing 
so, from within a capabilitarian framework, will entail looking at empirically informed literature 
that seeks to understand this link. 
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With this perspective in mind, one might look to the literature on how health is affected 
by people’s social standing. Michael Marmot, for example, shows on the grounds of extensive 
studies that people’s health; their changes of succumbing to heart diseases, cancer, strokes, and 
several other health related issues, are to a significant degree influenced by their opportunities 
for social participation and autonomy compared to their co-citizens. In other words, inequalities 
in societal status and autonomy affect individuals’ absolute levels of health (Marmot 2004). Or 
in our terms, unequal levels of capabilities related to fundamental interests of a social being 
brings about insufficiencies in capabilities related to biological and physical human needs. In a 
similar spirit, Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett argue that economic inequalities – and 
especially, through their effect on individual perceptions of their place in the social hierarchy 
(“how inequality gets under the skin”) – affect a broad range of societal issues such as life 
expectancy, violence, and mental health negatively (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). Again, then, 
unequal levels of capabilities related to fundamental interests of a social being lead to people 
experiencing insufficiencies in other capability categories. If we care about people having 
enough of certain capabilities, then, there are still good reasons to worry about inequalities - but 
because inequalities in certain capabilities can lead to insufficiencies in others. And in other 
cases, because distributions are akin to zero-sum games, in which one person getting more of a 
certain capability necessarily means that the value of someone else’s holding decreases. In both 
cases, one can say that the capability has positional aspects (although, we will distinguish 
between the two manners in which they are positional below - as quasi-positional and positional, 
respectively). 
        Positional goods are ones for which the absolute value of the good is affected by how 
much one has relative to others (Brighouse & Swift 2006, 472). Consequently, large inequalities 
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in the distribution of a good which is entirely positional will result in the worst-off group being 
below the threshold of sufficiency with respect to its value, regardless of how much they have in 
absolute terms. In almost all cases, individual capabilities have some positional aspects meaning 
that an unequal distribution will somehow affect people’s absolute level of one or more other 
capabilities. The presence of positional aspects, therefore, matters greatly for how specific 
capability thresholds should be understood. To see how this works, we now turn to the three 
categories of central capabilities. 
Generally, capabilities related to fundamental interests of a social being have strong 
positional aspects, meaning that one’s relative place in the distribution has a large impact on 
one’s absolute capabilities to succeed. This, as mentioned in the quote by Nussbaum above, is 
the case for voting, but it also seems to be the case for other freedoms, whose value is indirectly 
determined by others. Partly, this is due to the diminished capability in absolute terms of actually 
enjoying the freedom, but also it is because of the inherent symbolic value. Thus, for example, 
giving one group better capabilities for practicing their religion freely or for non-discrimination 
inevitably carries a message of disrespect and inferiority of status towards those left behind. It 
leaves them with insufficient capabilities of the relevant kind. In the same vein, it seems 
plausible that societal status—also in itself—be understood as a capability with strong positional 
aspects. This seems to be Anderson’s point when she claims that letting one group enjoy a higher 
level of capabilities for societal status than others necessarily leaves the lower placed individuals 
to “bow and scrape before others or represent themselves as inferior to others as a condition of 
having their claim heard” (1999, 313). In other words, the problem is that a lower status conveys 
a message of lesser worth in absolute terms. And this message is disrespectful, since treating one 
group as having less worth is failing to respond to their humanity with impartiality and failing to 
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respond properly to the equal importance of the success of each human life (Frankfurt 1997). 
Finally, the feeling that accompanies it is, ceteris paribus, a serious threat to one’s self-respect. 
Such circumstances would hinder any normal person severely in her pursuit of a flourishing life, 
and, thus, a relatively low status brings her below the absolute threshold. It is worth noting that 
this formulation avoids one line of criticism levelled against Nussbaum’s list of central 
capabilities; namely that it cannot explain why we should aim for an equal set of basic liberties 
(Richardson 2006, 450-451). Highlighting the positional aspect inherent in this type of 
capability, tells us why. 
As mentioned, most goods have some positional aspect, but capabilities related to the 
fundamental interests of a social being are special in this sense due to their intrinsically 
positional and relational qualities—they are essentially connected to people’s relations to others 
and their capabilities to participate in and influence collective projects. We shall therefore take 
the capabilities related to the fundamental interests of a social being to be positional capabilities. 
In these cases, what may seem like a problematic inequality above the threshold—and hence 
seemingly in accordance with the negative thesis—should actually be viewed as an instance of 
insufficiency due to the positional mechanisms involved, and thus would be condemned by the 
positive thesis Accordingly, for everyone to have a sufficient level of capabilities within this 
category of capability, the distribution must be more or less equal. Recall, however, that we are 
interested here only in central capabilities (regardless, as discussed, of how centrality is to be 
determined) and thus we should not worry about securing equality in non-central capabilities 
even when they have strong positional aspects.  
With respect to the other categories of capabilities, however, it seems more reasonable 
that distributional procedures ought to be designed so that everyone acquires a decent absolute 
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level of the capability in question, and that relative positions do not matter. This is generally true 
for capabilities that are not intrinsically positional. Neither of the two former categories of 
capabilities are intrinsically positional in the same sense as capabilities related to fundamental 
interests of a social being. Capabilities in the first category—that is, capabilities related to 
biological and physical human needs—such as health, housing, or nutrition are like this. It is not 
in itself a concern of justice that someone is more capable than others in these areas as long as 
everyone fares well enough. Certainly, everyone needs some level of these capabilities. But it 
seems wrong to say that people need equal levels of such capabilities to be able to lead dignified 
or reasonably successful lives. For example, one is not relevantly obstructed in a way that is 
problematic from the point of view of justice simply because one person has less perfectly 
enhanced health than others. Everyone having an equal chance of a successful life surely entails 
that people must have the capabilities for obtaining a decent and sufficient level of health, but it 
seems far too demanding to claim that everyone needs equal capabilities in order for justice to be 
fulfilled. That is, although deficiencies in health are critical, relative differences in individual 
health-functioning need not be. We shall therefore call the capabilities in this category, non-
positional capabilities. Inequalities in health, for example, are often thought to be unjust and this 
may, one might think, serve as a counterexample to our account. However, our account of 
capabilitarian sufficiency can accommodate this in three ways. First, inequalities in health may 
affect people’s autonomy, social status, or self-respect and, thus, give rise to insufficiencies in 
other positional capabilities (if, for example, people of comparatively good health are met with a 
higher social status). Second, even if inequalities in health do not necessarily lead to 
insufficiencies in positional capabilities, they will often coincide with and be general symptoms 
of such insufficiencies since social disadvantages tend to cluster (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007, 122-
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123; Marmot 2004, 14-15). This grounds the importance of health functioning measures such as 
life-expectancy in the Human Development Index and how it may play a significant role as a 
valid proxy for identifying the worse-off. Perceived in this way, health inequalities are 
worrisome—although not necessarily incidences of insufficiencies in themselves—because they 
highlight some societal groups that are clearly insufficiently well-off. This is aptly illustrated by 
Marmot’s famous account a subway ride from central Washington D.C. to Montgomery County, 
Maryland, on which life-expectancy rises a year and a half for every mile (Marmot 2004, 2).  
This leads to a third and final reason to care about health inequality. In some cases, 
what are seemingly examples of only inequalities in health are actually insufficiencies. Often 
critics of sufficientarianism underestimate the demandingness of the relevant threshold of 
biological and physical needs. On our own account, as we put it elsewhere, “if some faces an 
average life span of 55 years (as is the case, for example, in Malawi), they are clearly 
insufficiently well-off and under duress—regardless of the quality of their relations to other 
people” (Axelsen & Nielsen 2015, 421). So, regarding health capabilities and other capabilities 
related to biological and physical human needs seen in isolation only a sufficient—and not 
equal—level is required by justice. Equality, on the contrary, is merely instrumentally valuable 
due to the relational intertwinement between these capabilities and capabilities with strong 
positional aspects. In policy-making, then, these aspects must be kept apart if justice is to be 
attained. 
The second category of capabilities—related to fundamental interests of a human 
agent—is special. Like the biological and physical capabilities, the capabilities in this category 
such as affiliation, educational competence, critical reflection and normative evaluation are not 
intrinsically positional. That is, in contrast to capabilities related to fundamental interest of a 
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social being it is not true for these capabilities that whenever one person gets more capability, 
others are made worse off in an absolute sense. Consequently, sufficiency of capabilities related 
to fundamental interests of a human agent does not per se require an equal distribution for justice 
to be fulfilled. It is perfectly legitimate, for example, to hold that a society is sufficiently just 
when all have some reasonable level of education, a decent ground for affiliation, critical 
reflection and evaluation and so forth. These capabilities revolve around the importance of 
individual human autonomy—the ability to think critically, to evaluate normatively, and to set 
and pursue valuable goals for oneself—and as defenders of the value of autonomy have 
rightfully argued, sufficiency is the most plausible distributive ideal for such a value (Raz 1986; 
Dworkin 1988; Blake 2001, Nielsen 2015).  
On the other hand, the capabilities related to the fundamental interests of a human agent 
differ significantly from capabilities related to biological and physical needs in terms of the type 
of possible obstacles that may hinder the conversion of capability into achievement. These 
obstacles are recognized in the capability approach literature as conversion factors (Robeyns 
2005). The achievement of functionings related to biological and physical need capabilities are 
influenced by personal conversion factors that are, in a way, internal to the capability. This 
includes factors such as metabolism, physical condition, security etc. where having the capability 
(say for health functioning) basically includes these factors. On the other hand, the effective 
opportunity for converting human agent capabilities (such as critical reflection and affiliation) 
into the related achieved functionings is often potentially obstructed by external factors. For 
example, a person’s opportunity for getting a meaningful job that is appropriate to her level and 
type of education is not only dependent on her personal capacities and acquired skills but also on 
competition from other human agents and social norms. Similarly, a person’s opportunity for 
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affiliation is deeply dependent on the social milieu and cultural environment and not only her 
own personal capacities. In sum, although capabilities related to the fundamental interests of a 
human agent are not intrinsically positional, the obstacles which may delimit people’s 
opportunity to succeed in these areas is very often externally defined and rooted in the social 
context. In both examples, then, access to some of the important functionings to which these 
capabilities are key is determined by the capability levels of others, and are, thus, partly 
positional. In other words, their value is often (at least partly) determined by how they are linked 
to other capabilities. We shall therefore call these quasi-positional capabilities. 
Based on this analysis of how to understand the distributional logics of the different 
types of capabilities, the question of how to obtain sufficientarian justice within this pluralist 
capabilitarian framework needs to be addressed. We suggest that justice as capabilitarian 
sufficiency entails the following requirements: 
(i) Indexing process: Any theory, social assessment or political arrangement that adhere 
to social justice should concentrate (only) on capabilities that are centrally important 
for people’s lives as opposed to maximizing or equalizing preference satisfaction, 
welfare, or wealth. Although subjective preferences are in themselves not relevant for 
the selection of capabilities, any legitimate indexing should safeguard people’s 
influence over the selection process, due to the intrinsic importance of the capability 
of personal choice.  
(ii)  Capability typology: Any index of capabilities relevant for social justice would 
include three distinct categories of central capabilities: (1) Capabilities related to 
biological and physical human needs; (2) Capabilities related to fundamental 
interests of a human agent; and (3) Capabilities related to fundamental interests of a 
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social being. For justice to be fulfilled, a political arrangement must be sensitive to 
the different distributional logics of the distinct types of central capabilities. 
(iii)  Non-positional logic: The first category of capabilities are non-positional—their 
absolute value for a particular person is independent of what other people have—and 
thus justice requires (only) that everyone is secured a decent level of all such 
capabilities (health, housing, security etc.). Importantly, however, their 
interconnection with capabilities with positional aspects may, nonetheless, require 
avoiding great inequalities in their distribution. 
(iv) Positional logic: The third category is positional—that is, the absolute value of these 
capabilities depends on other people’s capabilities—and thus justice requires that 
everyone enjoys a more or less equal share of these capabilities (political influence, 
societal status etc.). 
(v)  Quasi-positional logic: The second category is quasi-positional—that is, these 
capabilities are not intrinsically positional, but important related functionings often 
involve obstacles from external social conversion factors with positional logics. In 
regards to these capabilities, justice requires that everyone is secured a sufficient level 
of all such capabilities (critical reflection, education, affiliation etc.). And, moreover, 
that no person is obstructed from converting these capabilities to their relevant 
achievements due to pressure from external factors.            
             
In the preceding sections, we have reformulated sufficientarian social justice enlightened by an 
overall typology of central capabilities. In this section, we have argued that bringing people 
above the threshold within a capability category may imply either an equal distribution or 
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bringing everyone above an absolute threshold and ignoring inequalities beyond this threshold, 
depending on the type of capability. More specifically, it depends on the empirical 
interconnections in play and whether the distribution of the capability is governed by positional 
logics. If this is the case, a person’s relative capability level determines their absolute level, and, 
thus, dictates whether they are sufficiently well-off. In other words, we affirm the negative 
thesis; that once people have sufficient capabilities in all these areas, inequalities are irrelevant to 
social justice. This pluralist view, we claim, seems in tune with how the requirements for living a 
flourishing life are normally judged, and joining it with the notion of positional goods gives 
intuitively appealing reasons for accepting the negative thesis for capabilitarians who hold that 
the human good is multifaceted.  
 
Conclusion 
Although the capability approach encompasses several relatively comprehensive and innovative 
accounts of social justice, most are still either undecided or underdeveloped when it comes to the 
issue of distributive justice. In this paper, we have outlined the sufficiency principle within a 
capabilitarian framework of social justice revolving around a categorization of central human 
capabilities that we believe most capabilitarians would accept. We have shown how the 
sufficiency principle should be interpreted when informed by the inherent pluralism entailed in 
the capability approach and argued that this pluralism serves as an argument for sufficiency; not 
against it. Furthermore, we have argued that what effectively determines the threshold of 
sufficiency varies according to the distributional logics within each category of capability, 
depending on the presence or absence of positional aspects for that particular capability. In other 
words, whereas social justice in regards to non-positional and quasi-positional capabilities 
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requires securing an adequate level for everyone, and protecting people from external pressure 
on their opportunity to succeed, social justice in regard to positional capabilities requires an 
equal distribution, but for sufficientarian (not egalitarian) reasons. This reasoning grounds the 
acceptance of the negative thesis of sufficientarianism. We conclude that this account of 
capabilitarian sufficiency shows much promise towards closing one of the central gaps still 
remaining in the development of the capability approach within the field of social justice. 
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i And indeed, poor people often choose taste and variation over calories even when malnourished, and 
in desperate need of calories. See Banerjee, and Duflo (2011, ch. 2). 
ii Although, Anderson’s preferred ideal is egalitarian in the sense that it claims we should aim for a 
society of equals, this is entirely compatible with saying that everyone should have enough distributively 
and be treated with a high level of respect (although not necessarily be treated in the same way). 
